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Liang Liu, M.S 
University of Pittsburgh, 2019
            Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is an effective security primitive to prevent access pattern 
leakage. By adding redundant memory accesses, ORAM prevents attackers from revealing the 
patterns in the access sequences. However, ORAM tends to introduce a huge degradation on the 
performance. With growing address space to be protected, ORAM has to store the majority of 
data in the lower level storage, which further degrades the system performance. 
In this paper, we propose Hybrid ORAM (H-ORAM), a novel ORAM primitive to address 
large performance degradation when overflowing the user data to storage. H-ORAM consists of a 
batch scheduling scheme for enhancing the memory bandwidth usage, and a novel ORAM 
interface that returns data without waiting for the I/O access each time. We evaluate H-ORAM on 
a real machine implementation. The experimental results show that that H-ORAM outperforms the 
state-of-the-art Path ORAM by 19.8x for a small data set and 22.9x for a large data set. 
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PREFACE 
This thesis is based on the one of my paper work, submitted to the 2019 DAC. By the increasing 
demand of confidential file transmission, lots of studies developed for the security design. Follow 
the recommendation from my advisor, Jun Yang, and my supervisor, Rujia Wang, I join the 
ORAM researching. ORAM is one of the most popular technique defending the side channel attack, 
and it still has an extremely high potential even after tens of years of study. I am very proud that I 
can one day participate in developing a new ORAM schemes.  
I hereby present my best thanks to my advisor Jun Yang and my supervisor Rujia Wang. We spent 
5 months working on this project. The initial idea comes up very quick, only with two weeks, but 
it turns out that the original design totally does not work. To solve the improper design, we spent 
about three-month and tried plentiful of methods and finally make it out. During this struggling 
period, Dr. Yang pointed out several defects and Dr. Wang gave me lots of advices. I could not 
have this paper without their help.   
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1.0 INTRODUCTION 
A modern cryptography system plays an important role when computing and processing sensitive 
data. Through years of works, researchers have developed numerous high-performance and secure 
data encrypt and decrypt techniques. Except the brute force, adversaries can hardly recover the 
original information only from the captured text. 
The trusted hardware, e.g., TPM [3], SGX [7], and XOM [8] secure the processing of 
sensitive data through data encryption and integrity check, which effectively prevent adversaries 
from revealing the plaintext or compromising the data. Second paragraph. 
However, information may be leaked through various side channels during execution. For 
instance, the timing information [17], memory access patterns [6] and the power usage [1] are also 
the accessible sources for the malicious adversaries. By observing or tampering with the sources 
above, attackers can retrieve sensitive data without directly reading the data contents. For example, 
researchers have discovered that on a remote data storage server with searchable encryption, access 
pattern can still leak a significant amount of sensitive information using a little of prior knowledge 
[6]. 
Oblivious RAM (ORAM) is a security method primitive initially proposed by Goldreich 
and Ostrovsky to hide the memory access pattern entirely from adversaries [4]. Several ORAM 
protocols have been developed since then. They share the same design philosophy: multiple 
dummy accesses or dummy data blocks need to be padded with actual data access, and the address 
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needs to be reshuffled periodically to achieve random accesses. The adversaries can only observe 
a list of memory addresses being accessed, but they cannot correctly guess where the actual 
sensitive data is. Moreover, since the actual access pattern should be concealed to the malicious 
adversaries but revealed to the controller, the designer needs a protected area in the hardware to 
store the essential sensitive information. In the section 2, we will discuss the details of the most 
representative ORAM schemes. 
According to the major invariants of ORAM, to achieve obliviousness, a single data access 
will couple with tens or hundreds of dummy requests. When the ORAM size is small, the entire 
ORAM protected data can be entirely loaded into the memory. However, with the increase of data 
set size, the ORAM capacity will also increase linearly. In such case, the main memory is no longer 
capable of storing such a large amount of data. Recently, several researchers [2, 13] propose to 
extent ORAM to the storage level to achieve access pattern protection with larger capacity offered, 
such that every data request needs to obliviously access both memory and storage, which adds the 
I/O access overhead to the original ORAM access overhead. 
In this paper, we present H-ORAM, a novel hybrid ORAM scheme targets at the slow I/O 
access bottleneck during ORAM accesses when the ORAM dataset is split in the memory and 
storage. This work tends to accomplish the following goals while still ensure the security, 1) 
Construct an ORAM interface with the cache function enabled: the cache is capable of improving 
the ORAM access time by removing unnecessary I/O accesses, without leaking access pattern by 
lightweight eviction and shuffle. 2) Decrease the data storage overhead. Our ORAM construction 
is more compact and uses less space compared to other ORAM protocols.  We describe the ORAM 
background and basics in Section 2, elaborate our motivation in Section 3, describe the details of 
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our proposed H-ORAM in Section 4. Our theoretical and experimental results are shown in Section 
5, and we conclude this paper in Section 6. 
4 
2.0 BACKGROUND 
2.1 ORAM BASICS 
Oblivious RAM protects the system from access pattern leakage by randomly remapping 
the address after access. In this section, we will briefly introduce the basic concepts of ORAM and 
then introduce the three classical ORAM schemes, square root ORAM [5, 18], path ORAM [15] 
and partition ORAM [14]. The square root ORAM is one of the most early proposed ORAM 
schemes, but it has been gradually abandoned because of its low performance. The path ORAM is 
the most widely used ORAM, and it is also known as one of the fastest ORAM. The partition 
ORAM is design for protecting the remote data pattern. 
2.1.1 Oblivious Access and Oblivious Store 
The basic concepts of ORAM include oblivious access and oblivious store, and all the 
current ORAM schemes are based on them. The naïve version of oblivious access claims that 
instead of only accessing the requested one, we should access all sensitive data. Since all the 
sensitive data have been toughed, the adversaries could hardly guess which one is the real one and 
the rest ones are dummy. On the other hand, the oblivious store claims that all the sensitive data 
should be store in a random order, and when accessing each data could only access once. Therefore, 
even though the adversaries obtain the permuted address it accesses, but they could not guess the 
actual one, but after a short period of accessing, we should shuffle the whole sensitive data.  Both 
oblivious access and oblivious store are the complete ORAM schemes, and they leak no 
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information. The drawback is that they consume too much resource. Both oblivious access and 
oblivious store expand the access overhead from O (1) to O(N). However, the oblivious access and 
oblivious store define the fundamental protocols, all the following ORAM designs are the 
combination of them and assemble their own optimizations.  
2.1.2 Path ORAM 
path ORAM is one of the most simple and practical ORAM protocol, which organizes the 
memory as a tree-like layout, as shown in Figure 1. Encrypted data can be stored at each node of 
the tree, and the ORAM controller translates each access into a path access with O(log N) access 
overhead. After fetching the data inside of the secure ORAM controller, the accessed data will be 
decrypted and remapped to a different path. Therefore, repeatedly accessing the same data will not 
reveal the same access pattern on the memory bus. Stash, position map, as well as other 
components in ORAM controller, need to be stored in securely. Path ORAM requires extra storage 
space to store dummy blocks, and the best utilization rate is around 50% [15], so storing N real 
blocks requires 2N space. 
 6 
 
Figure 2-1 Basic Scheme of Path ORAM 
2.1.3 Square Root ORAM 
A different type of ORAM organizes the memory space as a flat space. Square root ORAM 
[5, 18] maintains a permutation list which stores the mapping between the physical address and 
virtual address, as shown in Figure 2. To initiate, N data blocks need to be padded with N dummy 
blocks and reshuffled, to generate the permutation list. When a block is not found in the stash, the 
ORAM controller fetches the data from memory, and when the data is found in the stash, a dummy 
block also need to be fetched from the memory to avoid information leakage. After T accesses, all 
dummy blocks in the stash and need to be removed and the whole structure need to be shuffled 
and re-initialized. Compared with Path ORAM with O (log N) access overhead, square root 
ORAM requires a O( N) of access overhead.  
Path ORAM
Position	map
Stash
 7 
 
Figure 2-2 Basic Schemes of Square Root ORAM 
2.1.4 Partition ORAM 
Partition ORAM also uses flat memory organization. Similar to the square root ORAM, each times 
the partition ORAM fetches one requested block from the database to the stash. The difference of 
them is that partition modifies the condition to shuffle, and instead of shuffling the whole database, 
partition ORAM reduce the shuffle overhead each time with more frequent shuffle operations.  The 
partition ORAM divides the database into  N partitions and each partition includes  N blocks. 
The partition ORAM defines a shuffle period {v: v <  N}, such that after v blocks of data is 
loaded to stash, we should evict the stash to memory and conduct a shuffle. The shuffle protocol 
for partition ORAM is less density, which evicts the v blocks of data to a random partition p, and 
only require shuffling the partition p.  
Square-Root ORAM
Permutation	List
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2.2 THREAT MODEL 
Our threat model is similar to most of threat models [11, 12, 14, 16] that need ORAM to 
protect. We assume that the victim application is safe and the attacker can observe the access 
pattern of the victim application. We do not consider the side channel information leakage across 
multiple applications/ users, and the ORAM dataset is private. The application could be run on a 
computing node with secure hardware such as SGX so that the processor, as well as the on-chip 
cache, is protected and trusted. Off-chip memory accesses to the protected enclave are encrypted. 
However, the access pattern may still be observed if the attacker is able to tamper the memory bus. 
Another scenario is that the application is running on the secure local machine, and it is accessing 
a remote storage server. The user outsourced data to the cloud storage vendor and the 
communication (load and store) patterns could leak information.  
 
Figure 2-3 Server Setting 
I
Memory
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I
I
I
Memory
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Hard drive
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3.0 MOTIVATION 
3.1 LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT ORAM DESIGNS 
Except from the access overhead brought by ORAM protocols, current ORAM designs do 
not consider the deep memory and storage hierarchy in modern computing systems. For example, 
in ZeroTrace [13] when the data set is larger than the main memory capacity, they directly extend 
the leaf nodes to the storage(HDD) backend, as shown in Figure 4 a). The tree-top cache is a 
straightforward design since most levels are in the fast memory region. However, each path access 
is translated into multiple fast memory accesses and multiple slow I/O accesses. Also, the tree type 
organization is hard to adopt other cache techniques because of the low locality. Considering the 
performance gap between the memory and I/O access, plus the imbalance of memory and I/O 
usage, such design is inefficient regarding I/O bandwidth overhead. 
Using square root ORAM or partition ORAM in such case will reduce the I/O overhead 
because each time only one data block needs to be fetched from the storage backend, as shown in 
Figure 4 b). In addition, the flat memory organization allows efficient caching on the top layer. 
However, the shuffle operation needs to be performed frequently, and the entire storage needs to 
wait for the shuffle completed before next ORAM operation. 
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Figure 3-1 ORAM Schemes with Hardware Setting 
 
3.2 LIMITATIONS OF CURRENT ORAM DESIGNS 
The limitations of the existing ORAM protocols motivate us to design a cacheable ORAM 
interface with low shuffle overhead. 
Considering the basic structure of square root ORAM, as is mentioned in Section 2.1, the 
data is chunk into two parts: stash data and storage data. All data in the stash needs to be accessed 
when there is an ORAM access, which is an O( N) overhead. Accessing the data in the storage 
only requires a single access, but it needs periodically shuffle. The stash data can be stored in the 
fast memory, and the memory can use its fast access speed to mitigate the O( N) of access 
overhead, while it only assign a O(1) of tasks to the slow I/O. 
Memory
a) Path ORAM with Tree-Top Cache
Memory
b) Square-Root ORAM
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However, the results shows that even the fastest memory is hard to afford O( N) of 
redundant accesses. Our first design goal is to minimize the in-memory access overhead while 
remain the obliviousness. We adopt the Path ORAM for the in-memory data storage, and reduce 
the overhead from O( N) to O(log N) = O(log N) . 
Another inevitable overhead of the square root ORAM is the shuffle process. Unlike the 
naive shuffle algorithm, ORAM requires an oblivious version of shuffle algorithm such as 
permutation network, cache Shuffle [9] or Melbourne shuffle [10], all of which bring excessive 
overhead. Our second design goal is to minimize the shuffle overhead by introducing a new 
lightweight shuffle process delicately designed for ORAM. 
As a result, with the above approaches, our H-ORAM, can theoretically and experimentally 
outperform the state-of-the-art Path ORAM design in terms of performance and storage overhead. 
The basic sketch of the H-ORAM memory organization is shown in Figure 5. 
Figure 3-2 Our Proposal H-ORAM 
Memory
Storage
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4.0 H-ORAM: DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION
4.1 DESIGN LAYOUT AND DATA FLOW 
H-ORAM distributes the data to three different physical layers: a control layer, a memory layer,
and a storage layer. The first layer is the secure shelter, which utilizes secure hardware such as 
Intel SGX, and the operations and data inside of the secure shelter are considered tamper-resistant. 
The second layer in the middle is in memory and it stores data that can be accessed at a high speed. 
The third layer stores data in the slow but large storage. The design layout of the three layers is 
shown in Figure 6. 
13 
Figure 4-1 Design Layout 
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4.1.1 Control layer: 
The control layer should be protected by the secure hardware. In H-ORAM, the position 
map for in-memory Path ORAM and the permutation list for storage side ORAM need to be 
protected. In addition, the control layer contains the scheduler for secure scheduling. 
4.1.2 Memory layer: 
The data inside is organized as a Path ORAM tree, which can store up to $n$ data blocks 
(up to 50\% are real blocks). The in-memory ORAM works as the cache during the H-ORAM 
access. In the beginning, the tree is empty, and data is brought from the storage to the tree. After 
n/2 blocks have been loaded, the tree is evicted back to the storage and will be reconstructed again. 
4.1.3 Storage layer: 
The data inside is organized into N data blocks, each of which stores a small, encrypted 
and permuted data block. To ensure the security, we need to shuffle all the blocks in the storage 
periodically. 
To serve an ORAM request, the scheduler needs to pick and group requests inside of the 
ROB table. The H-ORAM periodically swaps between two periods: access period and shuffle 
period. Since the in-memory ORAM can support up to n/2 I/O accesses before next shuffle, we 
allow n/2 I/O accesses for each access period. For each access, the scheduler will scan the ROB 
table from the beginning and fetch c requests in the table. (see Section 4.2). Then, the scheduler 
will firstly check the permutation list for each request. The permutation list records: 1) a Boolean 
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bit represents whether a block is loaded into memory already, 2) its file address if in storage (or 
the position map id if in memory). After scanning the ROB table, the scheduler computes 1 I/O 
address and c in-memory path addresses. The I/O fetches the miss data from the storage to the 
stash of in-memory path ORAM and assign a random leaf id to it. To utilize the port usage, the 
I/O loads and in-memory reads are conducted simultaneously. When the group of accesses is 
finished, the tree access brings the data back to the ROB table, while the I/O access brings data to 
the stash of the in-memory path ORAM.  
When reaching the n/2 limit, the H-ORAM will call the shuffle function. The shuffle period 
includes three procedures: 1) Evict the path ORAM tree. 2) Shuffle the entire storage data. 3) 
Initialize a new Path ORAM tree. The detail is shown in the section 4.3. 
4.2 SECURE SCHEDULER FOR CACHE PURPOSE 
The main reasons that we redesign the square root ORAM is that its structure and its reading 
strategy is the same as the CPU cache. However, for the ORAM design, we must ensure the 
security, so we develop a corresponded scheduler scheme. Our scheduler mainly achieves two 
main functions: one is the grouping strategy and the other is I/O pre-fetching.  Our secure scheduler 
ensures that the hit and miss information for each request keeps unknown for the outside attacker. 
Therefore, we group multiple requests in to a group that contains similar access pattern. In this 
section, we introduce the group strategy of scheduler and the I/O pre-fetching to improve the hit 
rate while remaining the oblivious access pattern. 
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The scheduler groups every c of the in-coming requests {R1, R2, … Rc} as a group. The c 
value depends on the hit-rate of the current stage, and our goal is to make that on average in every 
group, there are c of hit requests and 1 miss. Our scheduler will firstly schedule the I/O load for 
the miss request, and after the miss request is fetch to memory, we conduct c of in-memory reads 
for the next cycle. 
Since there exist variances among the requests, we cannot exactly find c hit and 1 miss in 
every cycle, so we have to pad the dummy reads or loads to fill the blank. We further propose an 
I/O pre-fetching optimization to reduce the dummy requests padded per cycle by early searching 
next available requests in the ROB table. we define a distance {d: d> c} such that during each I/O 
cycle, the scheduler will scan the next d requests to find a proper match for the current schedule 
group. 
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Figure 4-2 An Example of Request Scheduler with Prefetching 
Figure 7 shows an example of our group strategy with I/O pre-fetching optimization. In the 
example, we assume that c=3 and d=9. At the first cycle, the scheduler scans all 9 requests in the 
queue and schedules the first miss request M1 as a I/O load task. The missed data will then be 
loaded into the stash and has its path position recorded in the position map. In the second cycle, 
three hit in-memory Path ORAM read requests {H1, H2, H3} and the next miss M2 are serviced. 
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After the Cycle 2 is done, the M1 is potentially written back to the in-memory ORAM tree, or still 
in the stash. Therefore, at Cycle 3, if the M1 is in the ORAM, we read the data as a hit request, and 
if M1 is in the stash, we read the corresponding path and write M1 back to the in-memory ORAM. 
The scheduler repeats the same strategy to reorder and group requests, to minimize the number of 
dummy requests needed per cycle. 
Although the hit rate varies across the execution, we use c to represent the average hit rate 
over a constant period. The whole access period can be divided into s stages, and we use different 
c value for different stage to evaluate. At the beginning, the in-memory ORAM is empty, so the c 
is set at a small value. When the in-memory ORAM caches more data, c can be set at a bigger 
value to issue more in-memory hit requests. 
4.3 EVICT AND SHUFFLE 
In this section, we discuss how data is managed during the shuffle period of H-ORAM. 
4.3.1 Oblivious Tree Evict: 
 Since the in-memory data tree is exposed to adversaries, when we call the eviction function, 
we should ensure its obliviousness (without leaking which block is dummy). Here we design a 
simple approach: 1) Read all the block (both real and dummy) from tree into a temporary buffer. 
2) Run the oblivious shuffle on this buffer. 3) Scan the shuffled buffer and remove the dummy.
The reorganized evicted data is shown in read in Figure 8. 
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Figure 4-3 Eviction Process 
4.3.2 Group and partition shuffle: 
 The original square root ORAM has an oblivious shuffle stage which brings too much 
overhead O(4N) of I/O overhead. To reduce the shuffle overhead, we divide the storage into 
multiple partitions. Similar to the Partition ORAM, we divide the whole data set into √N of 
partitions and each partition stores √N blocks of data. As is shown in Figure 9, during the shuffle 
Beginning:	empty Continue	loading The	tree	is	full
Destroy	the	tree	and	shuffle	with	dummy
Remove	the	dummy
20 
period, the partitions are shuffled sequentially from the left to right. During the i th shuffle, the 
controller firstly reads i th partition (cold data) to the memory and concatenates it with the i th 
pieces of evicted data (hot data) and shuffle them as whole. The in-memory shuffle algorithm is 
free to choose because memory is fast enough, and we use the cache shuffle here. Finally, we write 
the shuffled partition to the storage and then process the (i+1) th shuffle. 
Figure 4-4 Evict and Shuffle Stage of H-ORAM 
Memory.  (Evicted Data)
Partition i
Storage
Memory
Storage
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4.3.3 Security proof: 
The different between the proposed group partition shuffle and the partition ORAM is the 
order of partition to shuffle. We conduct the shuffle from the first partition to the √N partition 
{1,2, …, √N}. The partition ORAM conduct the shuffle by randomly choosing a partition p, which 
products a sequence {p1, p2, …, p√N}. However, since both of our H-ORAM and partition ORAM 
provide the unbiased partition access, which ensure the equivalent possibility of access every 
partition, which is i \subset {1, 2, …, √N}, P(i) = 1/√N . Therefore, the expect value of i th partition 
to be shuffle for both schemes are equal. Therefore, our proposed partition shuffle has the 
equivalent security to the partition ORAM shuffle stage.   
4.4 SECURITY ANALYSIS 
Our proposed H-ORAM is secure in the following aspects: 
4.4.1 Access Security: 
The H-ORAM achieves highest security protection when conducting in-memory and I/O 
access. The in-memory access is protected by path ORAM protocol, which is proof secure by 
randomly changing the location of data. The data fetch from I/O is shuffled after n accesses, and 
only accessed once per access period, which is also proof secure by the square root ORAM. 
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4.4.2 Scheduler Security: 
Reviewing from the previous cache design, there is not such an absolutely secure scheduler method 
to hide the hit or miss information. In this paper, we use the group method to hide the hit or miss 
information to all parties except the user. However, our design only based on the single user setting, 
and all the data is requested by the user. Even without leaking, the user can compute hit or miss 
information from the previous request sequence. 
We use the group strategy to hide the hit or miss information to all parties except the user. 
The adversaries are not able to infer anything from the hit/miss observed on the memory bus, 
because each scheduling group has the same hit and miss pattern. Reviewing from the previous 
cache design, there is not such an absolutely secure scheduler method to hide the hit or miss 
information. In this paper, we use the group method to hide the hit or miss information to all parties 
except the user. However, our design only based on the single user setting, and all the data is 
requested by the user. Even without leaking, the user can compute hit or miss information from 
the previous request sequence. 
4.4.3 Shuffle Obliviousness: 
In the initial square root requires an oblivious version of shuffle, but the oblivious version of 
shuffle already exceeds the requirement of ORAM. In the square root ORAM setting, every after 
a certain period of accessing, the whole dataset should be shuffle. Every data in the storage will 
only be touched once before shuffle. In addition, both path ORAM and partition ORAM avoid 
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spending extra in handling cold data, for example, when the path ORAM enter a stable period, the 
cold data will remain in a certain place and not change frequently. 
Our eviction and shuffle ensure the data is periodically permuted in storage. Our design 
follows the setting of partition ORAM and group the evicted data with cold data in storage into 
√N for partition shuffle, which achieves the equivalent security of partition ORAM. Instead, the
oblivious version of shuffle already exceeds the requirement of ORAM. Both path ORAM and 
partition ORAM avoid spending extra in handling cold data, for example, when the path ORAM 
enter a stable period, the cold data will remain in a certain place and not change frequently. Our 
design follows the setting of partition ORAM (full obliviousness for hot data, half for cold data), 
and achieve the equivalent security of partition ORAM. As long as no practical attack works for 
the partition ORAM, our shuffle algorithm is secure. 
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5.0 RESULTS 
5.1 THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
Our baseline is the tree-top-cache path ORAM. In the rest calculation, we denote $N$ as the total 
amount of block, Z as the bucket size, n/2 as the amount of real block in memory. In section 4.2, 
we define c as the number of memory requests serviced when waiting for one I/O request. To 
simplify the process, we compute the average value c, which considers the different execution 
stages, where ci, ni are the number of the memory requests serviced per stage.1+2s 
ĉ =  
2
n
(c1n1 + c2n2 + ⋯ csns) 
(5-1) 
Then, we calculate the I/O overhead of the Path ORAM. Since Path ORAM needs to 
include dummy data no less than the real data, the total size of baseline Path ORAM to store N 
real blocks is 2N. Therefore, the path level is calculated as:  
path level =  log2
𝑛
𝑍
+ ( log2
2𝑁
𝑍
− log2
𝑛
𝑍
)  =  log2
𝑛
𝑍
+ log2
2𝑁
𝑛
(5-2) 
Here, we extract the right most part to calculate the I/O overhead. For the load and store 
operation, the average I/O overhead of Path ORAM is: 
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𝑍 log2
2𝑁
𝑛
(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠) + 𝑍 log2
2𝑁
𝑛
(writes) 
(5-3) 
In comparison, our H-ORAM fetches $1$ block each time during the access period. When 
finishing n c /2 I/O accesses, we need to shuffle the entire dataset. During the shuffle period, H-
ORAM fetches (N – n) blocks of data and rewrite N blocks back to storage. Therefore, the average 
access overhead is: 
{1 +
2(𝑁 − 𝑛)
𝑛 𝑐
} (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠) +
2𝑁
𝑛 𝑐
(𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠) 
(5-4) 
In Figure 10, we plot the performance gains of our H-ORAM over the Path ORAM, where 
the y-axis shows how many times of overhead is reduced and the x-axis represents the N/n ratio 
(storage size/ memory size). We use a moderate Path ORAM parameter where Z = 4. The result 
shows that when the ratio is small, the H-ORAM can achieve better performance over Path ORAM. 
For example, when c = 4, and N/n = 8, we can achieve around 8x I/O access overhead reduction. 
The best performance is 12 times or 16 times faster than the path ORAM. 
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Figure 5-1  Theoretical Performance Gain over Path ORAM 
Table 5-1 Overhead Comparison for One Period 
 (1 GB data size, 128 MB memory size, 1 KB block siz1 GB data size, 128 MB memory size, 1 KB block size) 
H-ORAM Path ORAM 
Storage/Memory Size 1GB / 128 MB 1.875GB / 128 MB 
Path ORAM level 16 16 + 4 
Requests Serviced 262144 65536 
Access Overhead 1KB (read) 16 KB (read) + 16 KB (write) 
Shuffle Overhead 0.875 GB (read) + 1 GB (write) N/A 
Average Overhead 4.5 KB (read) + 4 KB (write) 16 KB (read) + 16 KB (write) 
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Table 1 shows a concrete example that we have a 1GB real data set, and the memory can 
store up to 128 MB ORAM tree. Follow the previous calculation, for each access period, we can 
conduct 262,144 I/O requests without shuffle. 
𝑛 𝑐
2
 =  
128 × 1024 × 4
2
= 65536 × 4 =  262144 
(5-5) 
After the 262,144 requests finish, the entire dataset is shuffled (see section 4.3), which 
brings 1 GB (write) + (1GB - 128 MB) (read) I/O accesses. We calculate the average access 
overhead as follow: 
average access overhead =  access overhead +  
𝑠ℎ𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑙𝑒 𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑑
𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑠 𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑑 
= 1𝐾𝐵(𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠) +
0.875𝐺𝐵 (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠) + 1𝐺𝐵(𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠)
262144
=  4.5 𝐾𝐵 (𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠) + 4𝐾𝐵(𝑤𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑒𝑠) 
(5-6) 
Discussion on shuffle overhead: From the above computation, we find that the biggest 
overhead of our H-ORAM is the shuffle process, since it uses the expensive I/O to read and rewrite 
the whole data-set. In the practical server setting, there are some opportunities to mitigate the costly 
shuffle: 1) Perform the shuffle during the off-line time. 2) Considering the client-and-server setting, 
shown in Figure 11, the shuffle only runs on the remote server, so there is no need to transmit data 
over the slow network. 3) As shown in our experimental results, the shuffle process consists of 
sequentially read and write operations, which is 10 times faster than the random data access to the 
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disk. For the ideal case, without considering the shuffle as an extra overhead, our H-ORAM can 
theoretically achieve 32 times faster access time than the Path ORAM. 
Figure 5-2 Applications of Non-Shuffle Case 
5.2 EXPERIMENTAL RESULT 
5.2.1 Experiment Setup:  
We implement our ORAM interface in a real machine by using the configurations in Table 2. We 
use HDD as our storage backend, with the average read/write throughput shown below. 
Table 5-2  Experimental Machine Setup 
Operating System Linux Ubuntu 16.4 
CPU Intel i7-7700K 
Memory DDR4 Pc4-2133 16 GB 
Disk HDD 7200RPM 500GB 
Read/Write Throughput 102.7 MB/s ,55.2 MB/2 
Client
Server
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We implement Path ORAM and H-ORAM with the naive setting (no recursive). We randomly 
generate a sequence of requests in which 80\% of chance it will distribute in a certain area, and 
20% of chance it requests a random data. During the execution, we divide the access period into 3 
stages and set {c1 = 1, c2 = 3, c3 = 5} with number requests per stage {n1 = 0.2, n2 = 0.13, n_3 = 
0.67}. On average c = 3.94. We use cache shuffle as the in-memory shuffle algorithm. 
We show two sets of results that represent small and large size of data set in Table 3 and 4. 
The data size is the total ORAM size, but path ORAM needs as twice as the capacity to store the 
same amount of real data. Both H-ORAM and Path ORAM has same in-memory space. 
Table 5-3 64 MB Dataset with 25,000 Requests
H-ORAM Path ORAM 
Storage/Memory Size 64 MB / 8 MB 120 MB / 8 MB 
Number of I/O Access 7228 25000 
I/O Latency 77 us 1032 us 
Shuffle Time 729 ms * 1 N/A 
Total Time 1290 ms 25575 ms 
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Table 5-4 1 GB Dataset with 500,000 Requests
H-ORAM Path ORAM 
Storage/Memory Size 1 GB/ 128 MB 1.875 GB / 128 MB 
Number of I/O Access 129235 500000 
I/O Latency 107 us 1364 us 
Shuffle Time 9743 ms * 2 N/A 
Total Time 29657 ms 682041 ms 
From table 3, the tested HDD has as a read speed twice faster than the write. As the result, 
the theoretical gains for I/O latency is 4 + 4*2 = 12 times of H-ORAM, which is closed to the 
measured improvement (13\times). 
Because of the cacheable interface, we reduce the required I/O requests for same ORAM 
access requests. For H-ORAM, only one I/O access is issued per c path ORAM requests. In the 
small (see Table 3), we tested 25,000 of requests, and the result shows that our cacheable H-ORAM 
only needs 7,228 I/O accesses to finish all the requests, which is 3.5x reduction compared with the 
path ORAM. Similarly, for the large dataset test, we achieve 3.8x reduction.  
In addition, we observe that the shuffle speed is much faster than the theoretical calculation 
due to the intrinsic properties of HDD. The access speed is greatly depended on the randomness 
of requests. When the Path ORAM accessing 4 buckets, it needs to go through 4 sparse locations 
to fetch the data. For example, {4161, 41090, 114948 ,262665} are 4 bucket addresses when the 
Path ORAM access the leaf 33289. We observe a large variance between these four addresses, 
which adds extra overhead when using the HDD. On the other hand, for the H-ORAM, during the 
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shuffle process, the whole data set is sequentially loaded and written, and it can benefit from the 
fast-sequential access speed of HDD devices, which is 10xto 20x faster than the random page 
reading. 
5.3 DISCUSSION ON OPTIMIZATION 
After years of exploration, numerous of optimization methods have been developed for the Path 
ORAM and this trend will continue. Our proposed H-ORAM, also assembly the Path ORAM on 
the top level and optimize the protocol to suit larger data set with a cacheable interface design. The 
previous studies, that aims at optimizing the position map, stash or tree-top data can also be applied 
to our H-ORAM. In this section, we discuss a few potential optimizations that can be built on H-
ORAM to improve the performance. 
5.3.1 Partial shuffle:  
As shown in the experimental results, we reduced the ORAM I/O overhead to a minimal 
amount, but it brings new problem that after the I/O overhead is reduced, the memory become the 
slower one. Our primary goal is to balance the memory and I/O usage, but this approach fails to 
achieve a perfect balance. The most significant time spent on H-ORAM, is the shuffle period, 
which happen every n I/O operation. A full shuffle of entire data is costly. Therefore, we propose 
a lightweight and flexible partial shuffle protocol. For every shuffle period, we only need to shuffle 
a portion of the data, for example, r = 1/4 N. Instead of shuffling each partition every period, one 
partition is going to shuffle every 4 periods. The evicted data from memory keep concatenating on 
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the top of each partition until 4 periods after last shuffled. With the partial shuffle, we need to issue 
oblivious access that touches more redundant data each time. The less we shuffle, the more 
redundant accesses are required. Through this method, we can compute a proper shuffle ratio with 
a system profiling, which balances the shuffle overhead and the I/O overhead. 
5.3.2 Multi-users Case: 
Though the Path ORAM has the better performance over the square root ORAM, the square root 
ORAM has the advantage in the group access, such as the binary search O(N) comparing to the 
Path ORAM O(N log N) [18]. In the multi-users setting, users might request multiple data at the 
same time. It can be also regarded as a group data access. Our H-ORAM, as well as square root 
ORAM, inherently support multiple users to share one ORAM and does not bring extra time for 
the new coming users. Nonetheless, to ensure security, we need to build a more oblivious scheduler 
algorithm. When the ORAM protected dataset is shared by multiple users, the system needs to 
provide high throughput while maintain the obliviousness access between different users. Our 
proposed H-ORAM groups multiple requests in the scheduler, to maximize the memory bandwidth. 
When there are multiple users, we can continue to use the group strategy so that requests from 
different users can be issued at the same time. To protect the access pattern from potential 
malicious users, some access control protection is required and can be added to our scheduler. 
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6.0 CONCLUSIONS 
Current ORAM designs such as square root ORAM, Path ORAM, face the challenges when the 
data set grows out of the capacity of main memory. The unavoidable I/O accesses brings extra 
overhead to the expensive protocols. Meanwhile, it is hard to cache the ORAM accesses because 
of the unique memory organization. In this work, we propose a novel cacheable ORAM interface, 
H-ORAM, to reduce the I/O access overhead per ORAM access, and the reshuffle overhead which
happens on background. In our theoretical and experimental results, we show that our proposed 
H-ORAM outperforms the state-of-the-art Path ORAM by 19.8 times for a small data set and 22.9
times for a large data set. 
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